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A B S T R A C T   
African borderlands – such as those between South Sudan, Uganda and Congo – are often presented by analysts as 
places of agency and economic opportunity, in contrast to hardened, securitized borders elsewhere. We 
emphasize, however, that even such relatively porous international borders can nevertheless be the focus of 
significant unease for borderland communities. Crossing borders can enable safety for those fleeing conflict or 
trading prospects for businesspeople, but it can also engender anxieties around the unchecked spread of inse-
curity, disease and economic exploitation. 
Understanding this ambiguous construction of borders in the minds of their inhabitants requires us, we 
argue, to look beyond statist or globalizing discourses and to appreciate the moral economies of borderlands, 
and how they have been discursively and epistemologically negotiated over time. Narratives around 
witchcraft and the occult represent, we argue, a novel and revealing lens through which to do so and our 
study draws on years of fieldwork and archival research to underline how cartographies of witchcraft in this 
region are, and have long been, entangled with the construction of state political geographies, internal as 
well as international.   
1. Introduction 
The fear of invisible threats carried by the cross-border movement of 
people has perhaps never been more widely felt around the world than it 
is in the midst of the 2020-21 Covid-19 pandemic. Yet while the virus 
may be new, the fear is not. Cross-border migration was being demon-
ized by Western professionals ‘in charge of the management of risk and 
fear’ even amid the widespread anticipation of a globalized, borderless 
world at the end of the twentieth century (Bigo, 2002). There is a long 
history to the role of epidemic fears and controls in contributing to 
boundary-making and the pathologization of migrants (Dionne and 
Turkmen, 2020; Sahlins, 1989). 
The construction of African borders has often been contrasted with 
the long processes by which European borders emerged, as well as with 
more draconian contemporary border regimes (Asiwaju, 1985; Feyissa 
& Hoehne, 2010; Herbst, 2000). Our research area (Fig. 1) in the bor-
derlands of South Sudan, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) typifies the relative porosity, cross-border fraternity and limited 
state control of many African boundaries (Adefuye, 1985; Leopold, 
2005, 2009). 
Yet amidst the latest mass refugee influx into Uganda, our research 
also encountered considerable unease about migration, and a longer 
history of local-level concern over the effects of cross-border movement 
on economy, society and moral community. In this study, we therefore 
ask why – and how – even some of the more recently established in-
ternational and internal boundaries have gained meanings for their in-
habitants that seem to evoke global tendencies towards the 
pathologization of migration and securitization of borders. 
Such unease was expressed by some of our respondents (particularly 
government personnel) in the familiar refrains of global state security 
discourse: porous borders and migration blamed for crime, insecurity 
and resource competition. But we caution against the appearance of 
universality conveyed by such discourse, and indeed by the apparent 
commonalities of hardening borders and anti-immigrant politics around 
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the world. Global patterns are always locally inflected and mediated, 
and the territorial state is itself historically and geographically contin-
gent (Agnew, 1994). As borderlands scholarship has emphasized, 
boundaries only become real on the ground through the work of 
borderland inhabitants and border-crossers in imagining, negotiating 
and exploiting them (Feyissa & Hoehne, 2010; Johnson et al., 2011; 
Nugent, 2002). Understanding these processes of border-making, we 
argue, requires exploring local imaginaries and epistemologies of space 
that exist in dialogue with universal statist discourses but reveal the 
more personal, quotidian and intimate ways in which political and 
economic geographies are experienced and morally interpreted. 
In the course of our research we encountered such moral negotia-
tions of borders primarily in the form of discourse and action relating to 
phenomena which are commonly described in English as ‘witchcraft’ or 
‘poison (ing)’. This is unsurprising in light of the extensive anthropo-
logical work on African witchcraft as a dynamic, mobile range of ideas, 
which are often expressive of the hidden ways in which wealth and 
power accumulate and circulate across borders in a globalized economy 
(Comaroff and Comaroff, 1999; Geschiere, 1997, 2013; Ndjio, 2008). 
Yet as Amber Murrey (2015) points out, political geography has been 
slower to embrace such epistemologies as ways of negotiating spatial 
orderings of power and exploitation. The recent scholarship on African 
witchcraft, meanwhile, rarely considers how occult geographies relate 
specifically to political boundaries. In this article, we bring the litera-
tures on witchcraft and borders into novel dialogue in order to 
demonstrate how occult imaginaries are entangled with the construction of 
state geographies. 
In doing so, we are conscious of the dangers of seeming to reinforce 
Fig. 1. The northwest Uganda - South Sudan borderlands, showing districts (Uganda) and states (South Sudan).  
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the exoticization and stereotyping of African epistemologies. Why focus 
on witchcraft when Ugandans and South Sudanese also spoke about 
political boundaries in universally-recognizable idioms of state security 
and immigration threats? Our answer is that there are also dangers in 
paying attention only to the globalized languages of state territoriality 
and border security. In particular, such discourses can obscure the am-
biguities of borders for their inhabitants, who have to navigate their 
multiple risks and opportunities. For those who accept its existence, 
witchcraft is an inherently ambiguous set of phenomena: a means of 
both acquiring and attacking power and wealth (Geschiere, 1997). It is 
thus a particularly revealing lens for highlighting the often contradic-
tory effects of cross-border movement and a powerful explanation of the 
resulting inequalities. Crucially, witchcraft imaginaries are concerned 
not only with the security threats of cross-border movement, but also 
with its unequal economic effects: the sense that some people have become 
unnaturally wealthy to the exclusion, or through the exploitation, of the 
borderland populations. 
While witchcraft discourses may provide a powerful critique of 
capitalist exploitation and inequality they do not, however, provide a 
straightforward basis for resistance (Murrey, 2015). Indeed, our 
research finds that mobilization to combat the threat of witchcraft often 
works instead to reinforce the political geography of both international 
and internal boundaries in the region in increasingly exclusionary ways. 
Rather than representing an ‘anti-space’ of resistance to the state 
(Roxburgh, 2017), we argue that cartographies of witchcraft map onto, and 
ultimately strengthen, state political geographies. 
These findings are based on extended qualitative research in north-
west Uganda and South Sudan (Fig. 1) by the authors, in which discourse 
and action around witchcraft were frequently encountered in everyday 
conversation, public discourse and court cases, and occasionally in the 
form of more drastic anti-witchcraft measures. Oral and documentary 
historical sources reviewed include periodic instances of collective, 
often violent, action against suspected witchcraft practitioners over the 
past century. This is a region known for some of the most influential 
studies of witchcraft by colonial-era social anthropologists as well as 
efforts by colonial administrators to control anti-witchcraft actions 
(Leonardi, 2007, 2019). 
Colonial sources are of course highly problematic for revealing 
vernacular understandings of witchcraft, but they offer glimpses of the 
changing political and economic contexts within which witchcraft 
concerns were reaching the attention of governments (Middleton, 
1963). More recent ethnographic research on the region has also high-
lighted the significance of anti-witchcraft measures, particularly in 
constituting a sense of moral community and social health (Allen, 2007; 
Allen and Reid, 2015; Barnes-Dean, 1986; Storer et al., 2017). Yet there 
has been little consideration of how these actions and discourses relate 
to the region’s political and economic geography, despite its borderland 
character, nor to the modernity of occult imaginaries now emphasized in 
the wider anthropological literature. 
Our analysis draws upon data collected for multiple projects in 
northwest Uganda and South Sudan across a 13-year period. These 
projects focused on governance, (in)security and local justice and, crit-
ically, saw witchcraft concerns arise throughout, despite differences in 
project foci and methodologies. Leonardi undertook research in South 
Sudan’s Central Equatoria State between 2005 and 2014 involving a 
combination of oral history interviewing, informal conversations and 
court observations, for a series of projects on customary authority, local 
justice and land governance. Discourse and litigation around witchcraft 
came up repeatedly, as well as in the archival records on the region. 
Storer conducted over 200 interviews and ethnographic observations in 
Uganda’s West Nile region between 2016 and 2018, exploring trans-
formations in idioms of misfortune. Part of this research involved 
investigating anti-witchcraft action which had become a pressing 
concern for local authorities in two of West Nile’s districts. Leonardi and 
Fisher undertook further fieldwork (around 70 interviews) in West Nile 
in 2017–18 for a project on local-level articulations of (in)security, with 
a particular focus on spiritual and supernatural concerns (Fisher & 
Leonardi, 2020). While we did not conduct research in the DRC, the 
proximity of the Congolese borders and experiences of movement across 
them featured in many of our interviews in both Uganda and South 
Sudan. 
During our fieldwork, we encountered numerous vernacular terms 
deployed to describe occult practices, whose meanings sometimes 
changed across time or space. Some anthropologists therefore avoid 
English-language terms like ‘witchcraft’ altogether (West, 2005). But the 
terms ‘witchcraft’ and ‘poison’, and related ones like ‘wizard’ and 
‘witchdoctor’ are also commonly used by people in our research areas, 
and, like some of the shifting local terminology, their mobility and 
ubiquity can express important aspects of how the forces they describe 
are understood to operate. It is often the shifting, mobile and slippery 
meanings of these terms that add to their power. We therefore follow 
Geschiere in using a ‘loose terminology that can do … justice to the 
constant shifts and ambiguities of the central notions’, notions which 
often graft onto new technologies, tensions and anxieties (Geschiere, 
2013, p. 10). 
We attempt to be more precise, however, in our use of the terms 
‘boundary’ and ‘border’. Boundaries – both international and internal – 
are invisible lines delimiting state territory and its internal spatial or-
ders, while borders are constructed materially through ‘the institutional 
paraphernalia and practices associated with managing and policing 
boundaries’, such as customs and passport controls, and physical 
markers (Megoran, 2012, p. 465). Borders have also increasingly been 
shown to be constructed through imaginative, discursive and perfor-
mative work, and we therefore discuss this scholarship in the next sec-
tion in order to show that the trends in borderlands literature and in 
studies of witchcraft and other spiritual geographies show increasing 
synergies and point to the potential for closer dialogue. The third section 
introduces our research area and its historical, political and economic 
geography. In the fourth section we develop our detailed empirical 
analysis of discourse and action around witchcraft in these borderlands, 
highlighting four main spatial themes emerging from our interviews: the 
import of new forms of witchcraft by cross-border migrants, particularly 
returning refugees; the occult capture of labour across borders; the 
magical production of wealth, particularly through cross-border trade; 
and the anti-witchcraft measures which work to construct and reinforce 
local and ethnic boundaries. We conclude by reflecting on the wider 
implications of our study, and the value of understanding the con-
struction of borders and boundaries through the lens of oft-overlooked 
epistemologies, discourses and geographical imaginaries. 
2. Imaginative and political geographies: witchcraft and border 
studies 
The magical, the fantastic, the intolerable, impurity, violence and 
fear, side by side with many other aspects, represented—and still 
represent—the foundations and empirical arguments often used in 
the making and consolidation of a myriad of limits, margins, di-
visions, boundaries, frontiers, borders (Neto, 2017, p. 305). 
To date there has been relatively little work on the occult or spiritual 
dimensions of international borders in Africa, Neto’s recent research on 
the spectral aspects of the Angola-Zambia border marking a valuable 
exception. Yet the wider scholarship both on boundaries and border-
lands and on witchcraft and spiritual insecurity have been moving to-
wards considerable potential synergies, as both increasingly highlight 
the significance of imaginative, moral and emotional geographies. We 
therefore suggest that there is value in bringing these fields together 
more explicitly in considering the meaning and making of political 
boundaries, both within and between states. 
The study of international boundaries may have begun as a matter of 
international law, relations, diplomacy and security, but since the 1990s 
scholarship from a range of disciplines has moved beyond legal, 
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cartographic and purely textual approaches to explore how boundaries 
are made into borders on the ground (Megoran et al., 2005). The 
thriving field of borderlands studies has emphasized borders not as lines 
on a map but as zones of interaction and contestation, in which multiple 
actors are involved in constructing, exploiting, resisting and shaping 
how state boundaries work in reality (Fauser et al., 2019). This work of 
‘bordering’ includes not only economic activities or institutional prac-
tices but also the imaginative, narrative and performative aspects of 
giving meaning to borders (Murton, 2019; Newman and Paasi, 1998). 
Borders ‘are often pools of emotions, fears and memories’ (Paasi in 
Johnson et al., 2011). 
Such approaches have been intertwined with new understandings of 
state formation as well as territory. If we understand the state itself as ‘an 
ideological and cultural construct’ (Mitchell, 1991), then imaginaries of 
power and state authority are no less real or effective than material 
infrastructure or institutional forms. State power everywhere ‘becomes 
effective as authority only because it invades, and is appropriated by, 
everyday epistemologies of power, of the magical, the spiritual and the 
extraordinary’ (Hansen and Stepputat, 2001, p. 20). The very idea of the 
modern state as governed by rationality is a central part of its myth and 
its ‘languages of stateness’, but should not obscure the power of other 
languages and myths in its construction (Hansen and Stepputat, 2001, p. 
15). State actors may themselves engage in imaginative and performa-
tive border-making, depicting international boundaries as ‘a moral 
border between good and evil’ (Megoran et al., 2005) and migrants as 
threats (Bigo, 2002; Gravelle, 2018; Vives, 2017) to justify the 
increasing securitization of borders (Deleixhe et al., 2019). 
African states are seen to have had less incentive or capacity to 
establish such hard borders, relying on the legal strength of their 
boundaries rather than effective governance of their borderlands 
(Herbst, 2000; Jackson and Rosberg, 1982). Yet the colonial imaginary 
of ethno-territorial ordering has nevertheless been perpetuated by many 
postcolonial African states in their efforts to define and govern citizen-
ship (Brankamp and Daley, 2020), leading to increasing xenophobia 
against migrants in countries from South Africa to Cote d’Ivoire (Adida, 
2014; Jackson, 2007; Tizora, 2019). Ethnic belonging has increasingly 
become the basis for claiming citizenship rights at the local level too, so 
that internal administrative and political boundaries are defined and 
contested in terms of ethnicity and autochthony (Bøas & Dunn, 2013; 
Mbembe, 2001; Sjogren, 2015). 
Given the colonial origins of the attempts to map political territory 
onto ‘tribes’, some scholars have highlighted precolonial territorialities, 
endogenous epistemologies and African traditions of ‘conviviality’ as 
alternatives and potential resources for resistance to ethno-territorial 
border-making (Brankamp and Daley, 2020; Nyamnjoh, 2017). 
Indeed, much research has emphasized the maintenance of solidarities 
and identities across African borders and the value of transborder eco-
nomic networks (Adefuye, 1985; Feyissa & Hoehne, 2010). 
Yet as Nyamnjoh stresses, conviviality also contains risks, tensions 
and the challenge of balancing ‘intimacy and distance’ (Nyamnjoh, 
2017, p. 264). It is precisely these tensions that also produce fears of 
witchcraft, according to Geschiere, who identifies common tendencies 
across continents and periods for occult fears to be directed at close 
relatives and neighbours, exposing the inherent dangers hidden in re-
lationships that rely on trust. Yet, importantly, the dangers come from 
outside the intimate sphere into which they are carried by the suspected 
witch, who thus operates across the moral boundary between ‘inside’ 
and ‘outside’ (Geschiere, 2013; Allen, 1993). There are parallels with 
the ‘relentless movement’ of witches in European historical imaginaries 
(Williams, 2016). Contemporary African witchcraft discourses similarly 
emphasize the ability of occult threats to transcend distances between 
town and village or even across continents, especially as families 
become ever more mobile and dispersed (Geschiere, 2013). 
Far from demonstrating African exceptionalism then, witchcraft 
concerns across the continent and in many other global contexts reflect 
the universal tensions inherent in intimate relations and their 
interaction with the world beyond. This has made occult discourses 
particularly apt for expressing the effects of globalisation and capitalism 
in compressing distance, penetrating intimate relations and creating or 
exacerbating inequalities and exploitations among those relations 
(Comaroff and Comaroff, 1999; Ndjio, 2008). Research on African 
witchcraft since the 1990s has therefore emphasized its ‘modernity’, 
fluidity and mobility, emphatically overturning any previous assump-
tions that it represented archaic worldviews (Sanders, 2003, p. 339; 
Geschiere, 1997; Smith et al., 2017). 
Efforts to combat witchcraft tend to focus on ‘containment’ because 
of this disturbing capacity for occult threats to bridge scales and to 
transgress boundaries, like the market itself: ‘Both tend to force openings 
where there was closure’ (Ciekawy and Geschiere, 1998, p. 5), whether 
by importing dangerous substances into intimate spheres (as in the 
poisoning accounts we discuss below), or by extracting the labour and 
life force of close relatives in ways that miraculously compress time and 
space (as in the widespread zombie stories that also feature in our 
research area). Such accounts can be seen as vivid expressions of ‘the 
“unnatural” states associated with making things move’ in extractive 
economies (Watts, 2019), and the way that global supply chains produce 
profits at one end and precarity at the other (Schouten et al., 2019, p. 
788). 
Occult imaginaries within and beyond Africa are inherently 
geographical and concerned with movement, scale and distance, and 
with the intersections and unevenness of local, regional and global 
economies. As such, they do not depict a magical otherworld operating 
autonomously from worldly affairs: occult forces may be invisible to 
most people but they take effect in the material world, moving in 
mysterious ways across space, often concentrated in particular locations 
and environmental features, and embodied in human, animal or other 
material forms. The saintly graves in Delhi where ghostly jinn spirits 
have come to be venerated are ‘sites of the intertwining of sacrality and 
everyday life, memory, and community’ (Taneja, 2013:142; also; Varley 
and Varma, 2018). Spiritual landscapes are fundamentally embedded in 
other dimensions of daily life and sources of security (Winch, 2017). 
Anthropologists have long recognised the resulting political signifi-
cance and ambiguity of African witchcraft, which appears as both a 
source of power and means of attacking the powerful, and can thus be 
both constitutive and subversive of state authority (Geschiere, 1997). 
But the political geography of witchcraft is only recently coming into 
focus, as scholars highlight how uneven development has shaped ‘ge-
ographies of fear’ in Melanesia (Eves and Forsyth, 2015), or how 
extractive landscapes are critiqued through Cameroonian epistemol-
ogies of witchcraft (Murrey, 2015). 
Thus far, however, there has been surprisingly little consideration of 
the role of occult imaginaries in the construction of international bor-
ders or internal boundaries.1 Yet the questions of opening and closure 
that anthropologists have highlighted in these imaginaries invite 
obvious connection with border governance. Movement across borders 
epitomizes the mysterious mechanisms by which mobility produces 
value – transporting a commodity across a border and into a different 
currency and taxation regime can transform its value instantly, while the 
more invisible and illicit the movement, the more value may be pro-
duced. The cross-border movement of people also generates its own 
hidden economies of paperwork, legal regulation and counterfeiting, in 
which rights and profits seem to be gained or lost in arbitrary ways. It is 
not surprising that borderlanders are often ‘very much absorbed by the 
question of the ways in which movement (imaginary and otherwise) is 
constrained and permitted’ (Stokes, 1998), or that witchcraft may be an 
apt way of expressing the ambiguities attached to migration (Sanders, 
2001). 
The fear that migrants may embody and import invisible threats is 
particularly prevalent globally in the context of the current viral 
1 Exceptions are Flynn (1997) and Neto (2017). 
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pandemic, but public health and security concerns have long been used 
to justify migration controls and border enforcement around the world 
(Dionne and Turkmen, 2020; Fauser et al., 2019, p. 485; Sahlins, 1989). 
Likewise in the region on which we focus, colonial epidemiological 
campaigns took a territorial approach, enforcing borders as cordons 
sanitaire (Bell, 1999; Lyons, 1996). 
We are not therefore suggesting that occult fears about movement in 
our research region represent a unique or extreme demonization of 
migration – far from it, given that these borderlands are still charac-
terised by considerable transborder conviviality, cooperation and 
fluidity of identity. But we focus on occult imaginaries because they are 
not part (at least explicitly) of the mainstream state policies and prac-
tices of border security and are therefore particularly revealing of how 
ethno-territorial notions of citizenship have nevertheless become 
internalised and vernacularized. Secondly, concerns about witchcraft go 
beyond the more universal discourses of migration to reveal the 
ambiguous and unequal effects of the political economies that are 
structured by both international and internal boundaries in the region. 
Thirdly, responses to occult fears reveal the constraints – and contribute 
to the hardening – of this political geography, because people’s capacity 
to take action against witchcraft is largely confined within the most local 
of boundaries. Anti-witchcraft measures and occult imaginaries ulti-
mately strengthen the political geography of the region even when they 
are focused on the smallest-scale moral community, because the 
boundaries of this community are increasingly defined in national and 
ethnic terms and by state administrative geography. Efforts to exclude 
and remove the threat of witchcraft from particular territorial localities 
are thus, we argue, an example of the broader practices of bordering 
increasingly identified by political geographers and scientists in ‘the 
dispersed and heterogeneous sites at which the border function of 
exclusion from the political community takes place’ (Salter in Johnson 
et al., 2011). 
3. The Uganda-South Sudan-DRC borderlands: historical and economic 
geography 
The borderlands of Uganda and South Sudan neighbouring the DRC 
(Fig. 1) provide a particularly valuable case-study for exploring the 
ambiguous meanings of borders for their inhabitants and traversers. 
These international borders would seem to epitomise the arbitrariness of 
colonial boundaries, cutting through social, economic and cultural 
communities and therefore resisted or disregarded by their inhabitants 
(Adefuye, 1985). Yet over the past century, these boundaries have 
nevertheless come to delineate economic regimes and conflict frontiers 
as well as state territories (Leopold, 2005, 2009). As such, they have 
contradictory meanings: crossing borders can bring profits or provide 
refuge, yet it also entails dangers and losses. Below we explore how these 
tensions and ambiguities manifest in changing concerns about witch-
craft. But first we provide some context for these concerns in terms of the 
historical geography and political economy of this borderland region, in 
which the movement of people and goods has been crucial for survival 
and success, yet also a source of unease and insecurity. 
During the nineteenth century, this region was depredated by the 
overlapping frontiers of ivory and slave trading emanating northwards 
from the East African coast via the Great Lakes region, and southwards 
from Egypt and Khartoum (Leopold, 2005; Titeca et al., 2020). The 
Turco-Egyptian government of Sudan in the 1870s and 1880s did little to 
inhibit slave raiding and violent requisitioning by commercial and im-
perial forces, leaving enduring memories of brutality, enslavement and 
displacement. The region was subsequently partitioned by the European 
colonial powers into the Belgian Congo, Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and 
British Uganda Protectorate. The Sudan-Uganda boundary to the west of 
the Nile was poorly defined in 1914 and some stretches remain con-
tested up to now. The colonial governments dealt with such imprecision 
and a spreading sleeping-sickness epidemic by forcibly relocating set-
tlements to create an uninhabited border-zone and banning all 
cross-border movement. Colonial administrations sought to categorize 
people into ‘tribes’ and confine them within territorial chiefdoms, 
establishing an enduring administrative geography (Leonardi, 2020). 
At the same time, however, the colonial economy was generating 
new demand for migrant labour from the region to work in the planta-
tions and farms of southern Uganda, or in the colonial military and 
police forces (Leonardi, 2007; Leopold, 2005; Middleton, 1963;). From 
the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century then, this region 
experienced external forces as overwhelmingly extractive of labour and 
resources. Yet the colonial administrations also coercively asserted that 
the movement of people conveyed disease – a concern revived in more 
recent years by fears of HIV and Ebola spreading across borders (Allen, 
2007; Storer & Pearson, 2019). The sense of ambivalence and unease 
that accompanies the opportunities offered by long-distance movement 
of goods and labour thus has a long history in this region. 
The postcolonial period has seen both continuity and change in these 
patterns. The continued marginalization of Southern Sudan, northern 
Uganda and northeast Congo contributed to multiple armed rebellions 
and waves of cross-border displacement. In one sense these refugee 
movements have reinforced cross-border ties and reciprocal obligations 
and blurred national identities among borderland inhabitants. But on 
the other hand, regimes of citizenship categorization and tensions be-
tween refugees and hosts have also hardened national identities and 
stereotypes (Merkx, 2000). Experiences of displacement and exile are 
often associated with the disruption of cultures and moral orders, as one 
of our Ugandan respondents emphasized: 
People came [back] from Sudan [in the 1980s] with different ide-
ologies, especially those who were in the camp, the different 
thinking. As we went to Sudan we lost, we lost that social network. 
What they did was to adopt an individual way of existing, everybody 
for himself … As we came [back], that bushman-like behaviour of 
people [continued], very rude … guns were rampant, there were 
guns everywhere.2 
Cross-border networks nevertheless facilitated the involvement of 
many borderlanders in the increasingly lucrative – if risky – informal or 
illegal magendo economy from the 1970s onwards (Meagher, 1990). In 
the early 1980s, returning Sudanese refugees were able to use ‘friend-
ships’ built in Uganda or Zaire to conduct illicit cross-border trade 
(Merkx, 2000, p. 4). Arua Town in northwest Uganda, together with 
smaller border towns and markets, became centres of this trade. Leading 
Ugandan businesspeople known as the ‘Arua Boys’ or the ‘tycoons’, 
traded in fuel and manufactured goods from as far as Dubai and Hong 
Kong, exchanging profits for gold and dollars provided by Congolese and 
Sudanese traders (Titeca, 2009). Cross-border trade was by its very 
nature secret and exclusionary. Smuggling involved moving at night or 
through ‘the bush’, activities more commonly associated with occult 
practices. Traders flourished while those living in spaces through which 
the goods flowed struggled, including at the hands of rebel groups like 
the West Nile Bank Front (Leopold, 2005). The bus companies, hotels 
and grand homes built by the tycoons were a visible symbol of emergent 
inequality (Meagher, 1990). The deployment of the Ugandan army to 
DRC from 1998 also saw more Ugandan state and military actors 
employed in the trade (Titeca, 2012, p. 36). While the Arua boys 
remained well-placed to expand into trades like ivory and to develop 
links with new partners like Chinese buyers, increasingly it has been 
Kampala-based businesspeople with high-level links to Uganda’s polit-
ical and military elites who have profited from the most lucrative and 
expansive commercial networks (Titeca, 2018). Similarly in South 
Sudan, the most profitable cross-border commerce requires connections 
to the governing and military elites (Walraet, 2013). 
2 Interview with Former Government Employee, Lefori, Moyo District, 
Uganda, 21 May 2017. 
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The inequalities of the trading economy also contributed to re-
sentments along national lines. After the end of the Sudanese civil war in 
2005, cross-border trade boomed and many Ugandans found employ-
ment and business opportunities in Southern Sudan. The trade remained 
heavily controlled by Ugandans, producing resentment and increasing 
hostility towards them in Southern Sudan (Titeca, 2009, p. 14). Ugan-
dans complained of unregulated taxation, harassment by military and 
security forces, and attacks on Ugandan traders (Ariko, 2007; Bwogi, 
2007; Daily Monitor, 2007; Kiwawulo, 2008). Similar tensions and 
perceived inequalities have characterized trade across the DRC-Uganda 
border, where Ugandan traders feel more vulnerable than their Con-
golese counterparts (Schomerus and Titeca, 2012). 
The dangers of cross-border movement only intensified with the 
outbreak of civil war in the recently independent South Sudan in 2013. 
Over a million refugees subsequently crossed into Uganda, while mili-
tary clashes near the border and cross-border incursions made the 
conflict seem uncomfortably close for the Ugandan borderland in-
habitants. The security threat posed by ‘porous borders’ had become a 
ubiquitous refrain by the time of our research in West Nile in 2017 
(Fisher & Leonardi, 2020): 
The number one security problem is the porous border. Moyo is a 
district bordering South Sudan … Lawlessness is more in South 
Sudan than in Uganda. The flow of small arms and criminality is 
uncontrolled in South Sudan, and that means they come into Moyo 
also and engage some of our people in criminality also. Then there is 
war in South Sudan and human trafficking: taking our youth to join 
rebel forces, either by force or by convincing them that they are 
unemployed here.3 
While the South Sudanese conflict and refugee influx provided the 
most common focus for these security concerns, some Ugandans also 
pointed to the wider issues of cross-border trade and criminality: 
West Nile is a very porous region. People are not sure of their security 
because of improved technology and skills. People can steal cars in 
Kampala and find it easy to pass through Arua to Congo or Sudan. 
That makes people here worried. Also people can kill and then take 
off over the borders, or commit robbery and then do the same.4 
The insecurity and economic and political marginalization of the 
regions on both sides of the Uganda-South Sudan border remained a 
source of grievance directed at the respective central governments by 
local politicians – and most starkly by rebel groups in South Sudan’s 
Central Equatoria. But competition for limited resources has also 
become channelled into more localized struggles over land and internal 
boundaries. Concerns about increasing populations – now massively 
exacerbated by the refugee influx – and anticipation of commercial 
farming and resource extraction have generated increasing insecurity 
over land rights, which remain primarily customary rather than indi-
vidually registered (Leonardi & Santschi, 2016). At the same time, po-
litical strategies of decentralization along ethnic lines in both countries 
have heightened the association between local territorial control and 
administrative and political resources, positions and power (Justin and 
de Vries, 2019; Nsamba, 2013). The result has been proliferating de-
mands for new ethnically-defined local government units and increasing 
conflicts over their boundaries (Leonardi, 2020). 
State decentralization strategies have effectively pitted ethnic groups 
against one another in the struggle for access to state resources and 
control over land and natural resources, so that the apparent better 
fortunes of one ethnic group or district are seen to come at the expense of 
their neighbours. Meanwhile the real profits in this borderland region 
have been made by transcending these local geographies, particularly by 
engaging in cross-border and long-distance trade, or developing con-
nections to state and military elites. The political geography of these 
borderlands is thus increasingly fragmented and ethnicized, in ways that 
serve to undermine any regional solidarity or resistance to the wider 
inequalities of national and international political economies. Instead, 
grievances over the unequal distribution of resources and the in-
securities of the regional economy tend to be directed at more local 
targets – migrants, refugees or the mysteriously wealthy. This is 
particularly apparent when we explore the discourses and actions 
relating to witchcraft, which are deeply revealing of the simultaneous 
opportunities, exclusions and inequalities of the borderland economies. 
4. Occult geographies of profit and precarity in the borderlands 
As we elaborate below, occult geographies are inseparable from 
political and economic geographies. International boundaries have 
gained additional meaning through their perceived demarcation of dif-
ferences in occult practices, both reflecting and contributing to the 
emergence of national identities. The region’s political geography is also 
not limited to international boundaries. Since the colonial period, gov-
ernments have used ethnicity as an organising principle for governing 
and territorializing their populations, with the result that internal 
boundaries between districts and counties have become increasingly 
significant and contested. Occult geographies again reflect and help to 
construct ethnic differences and to locate these spatially. 
What the occult discourses reveal above all though is that these forms 
of territorial organization and identification are fundamentally eco-
nomic geographies, structuring regional disparities in wealth and 
development while enabling commercial networks that both transcend 
and exploit the borders. The result has been more conspicuous in-
equalities and the sense that certain individuals are profiting from the 
risky borderland economy and invisible long-distance connections, 
while the majority suffer from the associated insecurity and precarity of 
life and livelihoods. Inequalities – whether between relatives, neigh-
bours or regions – are often apparent in the capacity to employ and 
exploit the labour of poorer people. These themes all feature promi-
nently in the concerns our respondents expressed about changing, and 
mobile, forms of witchcraft, which include occult practices referred to 
locally as ‘poisoning’. The spatial imaginaries of witchcraft and 
poisoning tend in turn to produce solutions which emphasize contain-
ment and bordering, which, we suggest, contribute to (rather than 
subvert) the political geography of the region. 
4.1. Cross-border movement and contamination 
There seems to be a long history to concerns about the potential for 
hidden threats to be carried by the movement of people in this region: 
some oral histories and colonial reports associate the origins of partic-
ular forms of occult poisoning with women from neighbouring or distant 
groups captured in warfare (Reference removed for review). In preco-
lonial settings, women were often the most mobile, moving to their 
husband’s territory on marriage, and might therefore be suspected of 
bringing forms of witchcraft from outside the community (Allen, 1993, 
pp. 367-70). But from the 1920s onwards, new opportunities for migrant 
labour made young men more mobile and are cited by South Sudanese as 
the source of new forms of poisoning acquired for the first time by men: 
What happened was that many people were going there to work in 
sugar or cotton, they got their money, came back and settled, got 
married. It is during this migration, and interaction with poisoning in 
3 Interviews with District Administrative/Security Officer, Sub-Country 
Administrator and District Councillor, Moyo, Uganda, 24 May 2017.  
4 Interview with NGO Manager, Arua, Uganda, 1 March 2017. 
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Uganda, especially among men, that some men also acquired this 
practice and brought it back.5 
One Yei chief’s father warned him in 1937 that Masindi in Uganda 
was the principal source of poison.6 In northwest Uganda meanwhile, 
Congo was more commonly depicted as the source of new forms of 
witchcraft. In the 1950s, the anthropologist John Middleton reported 
the introduction of new ‘elojua’ poison into Lugbara areas, said to be 
bought by local migrant labourers from Congolese migrants in southern 
Uganda. One of Middleton’s chief informants, an elder, instructed that 
‘young men should not go to Congo and get evil things’ (Middleton, 
1963, pp. 183, 246-8). 
Colonial medical campaigns against sleeping sickness and meningitis 
sought to spread the message that invisible threats could be carried by 
people across borders. There is some evidence that these diseases were 
associated with witchcraft: serious outbreaks of cerebro-spinal menin-
gitis in Kajokeji in the 1930s were accompanied by major witch-hunts 
(Leonardi, 2007), while recent interviews with Ugandan elders suggest 
that sleeping sickness was attributed to occult poisoning (Kovacic et al., 
2016). Whether or not they reinforced the perceived occult threats of 
cross-border movement, these medical campaigns certainly contributed 
to the hardening of boundaries. Cross-border movement increasingly 
had to take place under the cover of dark, which contravened the normal 
dislike of ‘night-walking’ associated with occult activities.7 
From the 1960s, international boundaries became lines between 
conflict and refuge, although these lines were also transgressed and 
blurred by rebel groups operating in and across the borderlands. Some of 
these groups have themselves appropriated and reworked older forms of 
magical protection and therapy, which had historically been an impor-
tant source of power but in the 1980s–90s became intertwined with the 
violent threat posed by groups like Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army or 
the Congolese Mai Mai (van Bockhaven, 2020; Titeca, 2010). 
The movements of refugees also became associated with increasing 
and new forms of witchcraft and poisoning. In 1980s Southern Sudan, 
Ugandan refugees from West Nile were subject to considerable hard-
ships and the ‘forced urbanization’ of the refugee camps, where Har-
rell-Bond (1986) recorded acts of ‘mob justice’ to manage people 
suspected of poisoning. Some Ugandans now claim that new and more 
potent forms of poison or witchcraft were obtained by people when they 
were in Sudan, leading to collective action and killing of suspects after 
their return (Allen and Reid, 2015).8 
Other West Nilers fled over the Congo border, where they lived 
among Congolese citizens rather than in refugee camps. Survival often 
depended on living among strangers and assimilating in order to trade, 
which posed particular moral dilemmas. An elder emphasized the occult 
dimensions of this sense of change: 
When people went to exile, people went and learnt new cultures …. 
They came back and started to drink, started practicing mazi, those 
things weren’t there before. That is why you see things like evil 
spirits here now; people brought them from exile [in] 1982, ‘83.9 
The returns of West Nilers in the 1980s were accompanied by a major 
influx of Southern Sudanese refugees fleeing war. The latter’s lengthy 
exile in Uganda is also associated with the acquisition of new forms of 
witchcraft, which accompanied their return after 2005: 
Abiba is a form of witchcraft, which was brought by Sudanese re-
turnees from Uganda … Abiba is new and people learned about it in 
exile in Uganda. They bought this kind of poison from markets in the 
Lugbara areas of Maracha in the Terego land. Some poisons were also 
bought from Ma’di on the eastern bank of the Nile. The Kuku bought 
abiba from Ugandans during the wartime, and are using it to kill each 
other.10 
A South Sudanese refugee in Moyo District similarly claimed in 2017 
that abiba was a ‘recent’ phenomenon, originating with the Alur of 
Nebbi District in Uganda, that he had only heard about in West Nile in 
the 1990s and which was brought into South Sudan’s Kajokeji later by 
returning refugees: ‘So really this abiba is foreign’.11 In 2007, people in 
Yei in South Sudan were also attributing an increase of occult poisoning 
to the return of refugees: ‘poisoning has increased because people have 
brought back these things from Uganda’.12 Blaming ‘witchdoctors’ (or 
diviners) for inciting mob killings of suspected witches, a South Suda-
nese police commissioner also emphasized the ‘foreign’ origins of the 
witchdoctors: ‘They come from Uganda, where there are many criminals 
… They are here illegally.’13 
Concerns and discourse about occult threats have played a part in the 
formation of national and ethnic identities over time, reflecting the 
interaction of occult and political geographies in the construction of 
state territory. Attempts by state actors like this police commissioner to 
construct and govern boundaries have recurrently involved the patho-
logization and criminalization of unregulated cross-border movement, 
while rebel operations in the borderlands have enhanced the sense of 
frontier threats. But occult discourses also go beyond the statist language 
of border security to reveal the significance of cross-border movement in 
structuring economic inequalities and exploitations. 
4.2. Capturing labour 
Economic inequality and exploitation have also been apparent in the 
long history of labour extraction in this region, from enslavement and 
colonial labour demands to more recent recruitment or abductions by 
rebel or state security forces. In the early 1950s, a Southern Sudanese 
politician was reportedly ‘concerned to find that the ancient superstition 
of Kulia Batu is still fairly widely believed’ in Yei District: 
The belief is that at dusk, saloon cars come across the frontier from 
the Belgian Congo or Uganda and carry off any unwary Sudanese to 
an uncertain fate. It is even alleged that the Yei merchants are the 
agents of the Kulia Batu. The words ‘Kulia Batu’ mean in effect 
‘cannibals’.14 
These cannibals were said to be ‘European, Arab or even Indian’, 
suggesting a link both to colonial labour recruitment and to the history 
of slave raiding in the region (cf. Shaw, 2002). Stories of colonial 
bloodsucking and cannibalism across east and central Africa offer ‘a 
glimpse of the world as seen by people who saw boundaries and bodies 
located and penetrated’ and constitute epistemologies for describing 
‘the extractions and invasions with which they lived’ (White, 2000, p. 
5 Interview with a Retired Engineer from Kajokeji, Khartoum, Sudan, 17 
February 2003.  
6 Equatoria Province Monthly Diary Oct 1937, National Records Office, 
Sudan (NRO) Civ Sec 57/4/17.  
7 Equatoria Province Monthly Diary Jan–March 1937, NRO Civ Sec 57/4/17; 
Interview with a Retired Engineer from Kajokeji, Khartoum, Sudan, 17 
February 2003.  
8 Interview with Social Worker, Moyo, Uganda, 29 May 2017.  
9 Interview with Elder, Onzivu, Arua, Uganda, 14 January 2017. 
10 Interview by Leben Moro with Paramount Chief in Kajokeji County, 
Southern Sudan, 13 November 2009; Fieldwork report by Leben Moro for the 
RVI-USIP project Local Justice in Southern Sudan, in Author 1’s possession.  
11 Interview with Refugee - a Teacher and Former Kajokeji County Councillor, 
Moyo, Uganda, 29 May 2017; also with Refugee Teacher, Ibakwe Settlement, 
Moyo District, Uganda, 31 May 2017.  
12 Interview with a Kakwa Chief, Yei, South Sudan, 20 January 2017.  
13 Interview by Leben Moro with Police Commissioner, Kajokeji, Southern 
Sudan, 23 November 2009: Fieldwork report by Leben Moro for the RVI-USIP 
project Local Justice in Southern Sudan, in Author 1’s possession.  
14 Equatoria Province Monthly Diaries Feb. 1951, NRO Dakhlia 57/9/24; and 
Jan. 1953, NRO Civ Sec 2 30/3/6. 
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5). In Uganda’s West Nile, kulia batu also became associated with Con-
golese commerce and were said to cut off people’s heads and put them in 
the foundations of storage buildings (suggesting a link with accumula-
tion). Respondents here reveal that fears persisted into the later twen-
tieth century and recalled being told not to sleep outside when they were 
young, for fear of being taken by the kulia batu: ‘These people were not 
seen, they operated at night, even it was hard to know what colour they 
were. They took anyone, women, men, as long as you were human.’15 
This particular threat appears to have been superseded since the 
1980s by ideas of zombie labour, which have also been prominent as far 
afield as South Africa, where ‘zombies are thought to have multiplied as 
wage work has become scarce among the young and unskilled’ 
(Comaroff and Comaroff, 1999, p. 290). In the South Sudan-Uganda 
borderlands, occult forces known as abiba or maji/mazi are said to be 
used by wealthy businesspeople to turn corpses or sleeping people into 
labourers, often in far distant fields: 
People think that you have died, but you have not died. [They] will 
bring back the whole body and put your spirit back in you – you will 
come back to life and you will work for him, doing any kind of work 
for them, not necessarily evil, you might become a slave, doing 
digging, so [you are] still there for them, visible to them but not to 
your people.16 
A suspected case occurred near Yei in South Sudan in 2005, when a 
recent grave collapsed and the deceased was said to have been taken by 
abiba; according to a relative, ‘people are blaming the driver who drove 
the deceased to Uganda, saying that the driver is a workaholic and has 
taken him away to work for him’.17 There are obvious parallels with the 
kulia batu cannibals in their ‘saloon cars’ in the late colonial period: 
abiba is even more explicitly related here to the cross-border extraction 
of labour and the profits of trade and transport. 
4.3. Secret profits of cross-border trade 
The migrant labour economy of the colonial period might have 
distanced the source of the labourers’ wages and commodities from their 
home communities, but the postcolonial economy of trade and smug-
gling has produced profits in even more secretive and hidden ways. It is 
not surprising then that the Arua ‘tycoons’ became a focus of occult 
rumours in Uganda’s West Nile from the 1990s. It was said that these 
men ‘went under the water to acquire mazi from Congo’.18 People were 
suspicious of shops which were mysteriously filled during the night, and 
said traders communed with snakes or white spirits. Mazi accusations 
were fuelled by the opacities of the cross-border trade, according to one 
of the few respondents to question their veracity: 
Mazi, it is not true. These accusations are everywhere, but they come 
up because people don’t understand about smuggling … These rich 
people – the ones that have developed Arua – they are supplying all 
these people who sell small things here. You see them going round 
town in closed vehicles, distributing. But in the village, people don’t 
understand these things, so they accused them of mazi.19 
The secrecy and subterfuge inherent in cross-border trade may have 
particularly fuelled occult explanations of its profits. But the inequalities 
and vagaries of the wider regional economy are also critiqued and 
perhaps combated through the association of sudden wealth with occult 
activities. Since the 2000s, accusations were also directed at rural kiosk- 
owners making smaller-scale profits from selling tobacco and other 
goods. Markets are described as sites for the procurement of poisonous 
substances and the services of ‘witchdoctors’, a term that has come to 
refer to the commercialised vendors of both protection against and 
forms of witchcraft. The growing commercialization of and competition 
over land is also sometimes cited as a motive for either accusations or 
use of witchcraft (Lindrio, 2019). 
The threat of being either targeted by or accused of witchcraft could 
be seen as a powerful levelling force, pressuring richer members of so-
ciety to display generosity rather than ostentatious wealth – both the 
practice and the accusations of witchcraft are often explained in terms of 
envy and resentment of the wealthy. For more sceptical respondents, 
witchcraft concerns work not as a positive levelling force but as an 
obstacle to development, a ‘pull-down factor’ as a teacher from Kajokeji 
put it: ‘If I go to dig in the morning, very early in the morning, and I make 
a good farm … they will say, “Ah, so and so has extra powers. Therefore, 
he has to be killed”.’20 An Ugandan district councillor shared this view: 
A farmer can concentrate and can cultivate there in the bush, you 
hardly see him for six months. When he comes back, he has planted 
five acres of cassava, when he sells it he has 10 million [Ugandan 
Shillings], when he’s building, you think he has made this money out 
of devilish power. Somebody’s doing a business that you don’t un-
derstand and they have a lot of money … so these are some of the 
reasons that people can suspect village members and can decide to 
chase you from the village and even beat the village member to 
death.21 
As in many other contexts, the use of occult powers has come to be 
seen not only as a recourse by the poor to express their resentment of 
more fortunate relatives and neighbours, but also as a means of 
becoming wealthy swiftly and ruthlessly (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1999; 
Geschiere, 1997; Ndjio, 2008). This more novel use of witchcraft by the 
rich is associated with the expansion of markets and towns, allowing 
spatial as well as economic differentiation (Geschiere, 2013). The 
opacity and vagaries of business in the borderlands adds to the mysteries 
of profit-making. But strategies to combat witchcraft tend to reinforce 
boundaries rather than to redress inequalities. 
4.4. Internal mapping and movement control 
In one sense, these occult forces transcend state boundaries – indeed 
this is part of what makes them so troubling. Yet the ways that people 
talk about and try to combat witchcraft are deeply entangled with state 
political geographies in this borderland region. Not only are particular 
forms of witchcraft associated with cross-border movement, but also 
with specific districts and ethnic groups – and districts have increasingly 
become defined in ethnic terms. Stories circulate about which districts 
or ethnic groups are the most potent sources of witchcraft, such as the 
Alur of Nebbi District or Mount Wati in Terego County.22 It is striking 
that a state administrative unit can become seen as a boundary between 
the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of moral communities such as Allen (1993) 
described in the 1980s. A district councillor in Moyo, for example, 
emphasized that abiba was a new form of witchcraft; when asked where 
it came from she emphasized its outside origins: 
15 Interview with Elder, Arua, Uganda 1 July 2016; Interview with Elder, 
Onzivu, Arua, Uganda, 17 June 2016.  
16 Interview with Trader, Maracha, 28 June 2016.  
17 Interview with Youth and Church Leader near Yei, Southern Sudan, 6 
September 2005.  
18 A common refrain during fieldwork, e.g. Interview with Elder (formerly 
trader) in English, Arua, Uganda, 9 July 2017.  
19 Personal Conversation with Trader, 8 June 2017. 
20 Interview with Refugee - a Teacher and Former Kajokeji County Councillor, 
Moyo, Uganda, 29 May 2017.  
21 Interview with District Councillor, Moyo, Uganda, 24 May 2017.  
22 Interviews with Catholic Priest, Arua, Uganda, 18 May 2017 Anglican 
Pastor, Arua, Uganda, 17 May 2017. 
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The normal tale is that they have gone out of the District (laughs). 
They go to buy from witches that they know; they go outside the 
District because these are things which we are not hearing of.23 
Such accounts work to reinforce the sense of identity and moral 
community that local authorities like councillors have worked to invest 
in their administrative jurisdictions. Ethnic difference and division has 
become the focus of political competition for positions and for the cre-
ation of new districts or sub-district units, so the emphasis on particular 
ethnic origins of migrant occult threats feeds into the dominant political 
idiom in both Uganda and South Sudan. 
The geographic imaginaries of witchcraft also generate particular 
strategies for attempting to contain and exclude it, often at an even more 
localized level than the district. Within the smallest administrative units 
in Uganda (Local Council 1, or LC1) or under chiefs, sub-chiefs and 
headmen in South Sudan, the threat of witchcraft is cited as a basis for 
regulating incomers. Newcomers (particularly strangers and those from 
different ethnicities) wishing to settle in a particular village or neigh-
bourhood are said to require letters from their former LC or chief, 
vouching that they are not witches or poisoners. A LC1 chair in Moyo 
District emphasized that residents from non-Ma’di ethnicities were by 
definition ‘squatters’ in the neighbourhood, and the automatic suspicion 
of migrants: 
If someone comes and wants to live here, I need to get reason why he 
shifted here. If I find you are a wizard, I cannot let you settle here; or 
if you like fighting … I have to research the background of a person 
before he settles here.24 
This reflects a long history whereby witchcraft accusations could 
force individuals and families to relocate, inviting suspicion of migrants, 
but also a more recently formalized practice of evicting suspected occult 
practitioners. In the past two decades or so, local authorities on both 
sides of the border have developed a practice of holding ‘elections’ in 
communities convinced of an immediate occult threat, in which vil-
lagers vote to identify suspects, who are then evicted under threat of 
violence (Allen and Reid, 2015; Storer, O’Byrne, & Reid, 2017). While 
such practices are not endorsed by higher level government and judicial 
authorities, they are perceived as a legal and fair mechanism by the 
lowest-level authorities of the local state, and recorded with a degree of 
bureaucratic officiousness.25 
Both this hybridized ‘modern’ practice of elections and more violent 
methods of eviction or killing are said by some respondents to have 
helped ‘cleanse’ communities from the worst occult threats, demon-
strating the efforts to make the most localized administrative units into 
moral communities. Since 2010, along the Uganda-Congo border, rural 
clan leaders have been involved in the writing of English by-laws, which 
are on occasion presented to village and sub-county authorities.26 These 
by-laws underscore the territorial approach to combating witchcraft, 
with an emphasis on the need for suspects to be evicted across long 
distances – specifically ‘300’ miles or kilometres. Some clans have 
developed ‘security wings’, where young men are involved in inflicting 
harsh punishments, particularly on suspects from outside the clan. 
Similarly a South Sudanese clan headman in Kajokeji near the Uganda 
border was proud of having ‘chased’ poisoners away from the area, 
adding that none of them were from his clan.27 
Collective action against suspected witches and poisoners can work 
then as a way of constructing small-scale territorial communities, from 
which the dangers and corruptions of migration and the borderland 
economy can be excluded or cleansed. Such claims work to the obvious 
advantage of the local authorities seeking to govern these territorial 
units. But they also feed into the broader reinforcement of state political 
geographies that divide to rule along ethnic lines, undermining broader 
regional or class-based political solidarities. Action against occult 
threats is thus an example of how borders and territory are constructed 
by the myriad small-scale attempts to define and govern the boundaries 
of political and moral communities (Salter in Johnson et al., 2011). 
These small-scale constructions of territory have come to overlap 
with how state boundaries have been imagined, understood and expe-
rienced by the inhabitants of these borderlands. Cross-border movement 
has been a fundamental part of their lives, enabling access to economic 
opportunities, refuge from conflicts and the maintenance of transborder 
relations and cultural communities in defiance of national regimes of 
citizenship. But the various occult themes discussed in this section also 
reveal otherwise hidden concerns about the risks, costs and unequal 
effects of these cross-border opportunities. Accounts of occult threats 
imported by returning refugees and migrants both reflect and contribute 
to the ways in which experiences of displacement across borders have 
shaped national identities and given moral meanings to international 
boundaries. Most importantly, stories of zombie labour exploitation and 
the sudden riches generated at the expense of one’s kin highlight the 
unequal effects of the transnational economies that traverse and exploit 
these borders, while life for the majority of borderlanders remains 
impoverished and precarious. 
5. Conclusion 
Our research area has been characterized by high levels of conflict, 
mass migration and high-risk economic activities, which may help to 
explain the particular concerns with the moral and social effects of cross- 
border movement that seem to feature prominently here in discourses 
about witchcraft. But we nevertheless emphasize the wider salience of 
our findings, in terms of the need to explore how boundaries are given 
meaning and territory is constructed in local, vernacular imaginaries 
and epistemologies. Amid the heightened global concerns with migra-
tion, disease control and border enforcement, it is worth remembering 
that territorial governance and exclusion are also local processes, and 
that understanding the complexities of these local processes through 
their vernacular expressions and idioms may be crucial to understanding 
the broader trends that they both reflect and perpetuate. 
The importance of imaginative, discursive, performative and moral 
border-making at multiple scales has become well-established in border 
studies within and beyond the field of political geography. Such ap-
proaches have increasingly overlapped with the political anthropology 
of the state as an imaginative construct and are also beginning to pay 
greater attention to alternative epistemologies and geographies, 
including spiritual landscapes. We caution, however, against assuming 
that endogenous epistemologies constitute an alternative or a source of 
resistance to state political geographies, securitising practices or pro-
jects of development (Smith et al., 2017, p. 146). Our case, and others, 
show that it may be impossible to disentangle spiritual and political 
geographies, and that state cartographies and boundaries have been 
constituted by, and appropriated into, multiple projects of 
border-making and local-level efforts to define (Leonardi, 2020; Mac-
Arthur, 2016). Witchcraft imaginaries are a striking example of episte-
mologies that continually shift and migrate in ways that absorb and 
reflect global capitalism and state politics. As such, they may do more to 
construct and reinforce than to resist state borders and administrative 
geographies, even if they also draw on older practices of cleansing or 
containing occult threats territorially. 
Far from representing a uniquely African form of border work, 
witchcraft geographies feed into and are fed by the pathologization and 
fear of uncontrolled movement around the world. But unlike the inter-
national, statist discourses of border security, the occult imaginaries we 
23 Interview with District Councillor, Moyo, Uganda, 26 May 2017.  
24 Interview with LC1, Moyo, Uganda, 13 October 2014.  
25 Interview with LC1, Moyo District, Uganda, 22 May 2017.  
26 Field observations and copies of these by-laws by Author 2, May 2016–July 
2017.  
27 Interview with Headman, Kajokeji County, South Sudan, 27 September 
2014. 
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have explored also expose the inequalities and exploitations of the 
economies that these borders structure. These inequalities are largely 
obscured by statist discourses and practices of border security, which 
seek to control (and often to criminalize) general movements of people 
and to enforce national regimes of citizenship and identity. Witchcraft 
discourses in the South Sudan-Uganda-DRC borderlands, on the other 
hand, are deeply revealing of the hidden profits and the inequalities of 
the border economies that state actors rarely discuss. These occult ge-
ographies highlight not only the dangers of cross-border movement but 
also the disparities in wealth between towns and villages, the increas-
ingly ethnicized politics of local administrative territories and the at-
tempts by local authorities to constitute spatial moral communities from 
which ‘outside’ threats can be excluded. This also means, however, that 
while discourses of witchcraft form a potent critique of the regional 
economy, the actions taken to combat witchcraft tend to reinforce, 
rather than undermine, internal ethno-political geographies and na-
tional regimes of citizenship. 
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